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CONFLICT & COMPETITION 2 
Abstract 
Conflict and competition arise when involved parties’ preferences and goals collide. This chapter 
highlights theoretical and empirical perspectives on the emergence and manifestations of conflicts. 
We outline how conflicts can occur from three perspectives: considering conflicts between 
individual actors, considering conflicts between individuals in competing groups, and considering 
conflicts between individuals within their groups. We show how individual-level preferences 
determine actions taken in dilemma situations in which outcomes are interdependent, leading to 
cooperative, selfish or competitive behaviour. Further, we summarize key theoretical perspectives 
about the formation of conflict between groups, and highlight how individual behaviour 
contributes to such conflicts. We show how individuals may be at odds with other members of 
their group, experiencing conflict about their relationships and joint tasks. Finally, we outline how 
coalitions are formed when more than two parties face each other in conflicts. In sum, we consider 
the potential – both productive and detrimental – that conflict harbours for social exchange. 
 
Keywords: conflict; competition; cooperation; social preferences; intergroup; intragroup 
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1. Conceptualizations of Conflict 
Conflict has vast implications for people’s lives. In 2016 alone, more than 80.000 people 
died in armed conflicts worldwide (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). Conflict between 
individuals, even about petty disagreements, can put an end to important interpersonal 
relationships. Conflict within organizations costs billions. On the other hand, conflict can have 
positive effects, when divergent interests and clashing views lead to creative solutions. Some forms 
of conflict can also spur parties on to be highly productive. Understanding how and when conflict 
emerges, how it plays out, and how it can be ameliorated or taken advantage of, are therefore 
crucial components of psychological inquiry. 
Conflict can arise in a variety of settings. The common denominator of situations in which 
social conflict arises, however, is that at least two parties with potentially conflicting goals are 
involved. In interpersonal settings, where interactions between individuals are studied, conflict and 
competition can emerge from the clash of individuals’ interests and expectations. In intergroup 
settings, in addition to the potential for individuals’ interests to clash, the interests of superordinate 
social groups can conflict, causing further potential for conflict and competition. 
Finally, sometimes, individuals also find themselves at odds within their groups: individual 
and group-level goals do not always align, leading to a potential for conflict. However, only the 
social setting in which conflict arises can differ; the actors themselves differ in how they respond 
to the challenges of such conflict-laden situations. While some individuals will prioritize their own 
outcomes, others will deliberately seek to compete and deprive others of their share, while others 
will cooperate to share resources fairly. Therein, conflict and competition are the results of 
complex interactions of people and situations. In this chapter, we summarize theoretical and 
empirical perspectives on understanding conflict, both describing situations in which people are 
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confronted with the potential for, and showcasing individual differences, contributing to sparking 
conflict and competition. 
2. Conflict in Dyadic Decision Settings 
Every day, individuals face countless big and small decisions that harbour potential for 
conflict and competition. From deciding whether to surprise your spouse with breakfast in bed or 
sleeping in yourself, to deciding between giving honest feedback during a shopping spree or 
sparing your friend’s feelings, navigating the normal course of life means deciding what to do time 
and time again in dilemmas that could give rise to conflicts. 
The idea that individual decisions in interdependent settings are the source of conflict is 
embedded in the broader decision-making literature. The roots of the modern investigations of 
individual choice at the cross-section of psychology and economics lie in the conception of 
Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and Subjective Expected Utility 
Theory (Savage, 1954). Given the assumptions of well-defined, transitive, continuous and 
independent preferences, these theories proposed that decision makers would behave as if they 
maximized their own expected utility over possible outcomes. Decision makers’ utility was 
conceptualized as related to decision makers’ desire for certain outcomes, and argued to be 
captured by observing or predicting choices (Samuelson, 1938). In other words: decision makers, 
according to Expected Utility Theory, are expected to behave selfishly. This, in turn, can give rise 
to conflict, when selfish decision makers struggle to secure the best outcomes for themselves. 
3. Conflict in Dyadic Decision Settings: Abstracted Perspectives 
Conflict and competition arise in situations in which outcomes are interdependent. In such 
interdependent situations, what one can gain also influences what happens to the other (Kollock, 
1998). For instance, in common pool dilemmas (Apesteguia & Maier-Rigaud, 2006; Musgrave, 
1959) in which a limited resource is accessed by multiple users (e.g., fish in the oceans), individual 
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motives to exploit the resource for one’s own benefit (i.e., fish as much as you can, to eat the fish 
yourself or to sell it) are at odds with others’ outcomes (i.e., every fish you fish is a fish that I 
cannot fish). Further escalating the potential for conflicts, in such dilemmas, selfish motives could 
even harm the long-term sustainability of the resource (i.e., if we fish above the threshold of fish 
reproducing to keep the population size intact, fish provision may collapse).  
Relatedly, consider the Prisoner’s dilemma game (Ledyard, 1995; Figure 1), in which the 
outcomes of two players are at odds. In this game, decision makers have two options. When both 
players choose option A (cooperate), each player’s outcome is 3 units. When both players choose 
option B (defect), each player’s outcome is 1 unit. When player 1 chooses option A (cooperate) but 
player 2 chooses option B (defect), player 1 receives nothing, while player B receives 4 units, and 
vice versa. In this example, assume that decision makers simultaneously decide which option to 
choose, accumulate payoffs over twenty rounds, and have perfect information (i.e., both players 
know the number of rounds as well as the contributions of the other player, and that the other 
player also has all information). Players could try to cooperate, therefore maximizing the joint 
payoff. However, to maximize individual payoff, a player would want to defect in the last round, to 
earn the tempting outcome of 4 units in case the other player continues to cooperate, or to avoid 
remaining empty-handed in this round in case the other player defects. By backward induction 
(Selten, 1978), this is also true for the second-to-last round, and for all other rounds, making 
defection the rational course of action (i.e., the subgame perfect equilibrium): full defection should 
occur in such situations. In other words: individuals would be expected to struggle to secure 
resources for themselves, thereby forgoing potentially larger outcomes harboured by cooperative 
strategies. Because defection must be expected from all parties involved, the cooperative potential 
of a situation cannot be taken advantage of. Cooperation breaks down. 
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Psychological research responded to Expected Utility Theory by questioning its descriptive 
validity and, consequently, its theoretical pre-eminence. This critical attitude also addressed the 
fundamental assumption of Expected Utility Theory that actors would behave rationally to 
maximize their own utility. In particular, empirical evidence demonstrated the violation of the 
maximization of self-interest even in the two-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, solved by 
backward induction above: Decision makers do not defect fully (e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011; van Lange, 
Joireman, Parks, & van Dijk, 2013). While some decision makers will indeed defect to secure their 
outcomes, some decision makers cooperate so that cooperation does not break down. 
4. Conflict in Dyadic Decision Settings: Individual Preferences 
Instead of assuming that decision makers will always do what maximizes their own 
material outcomes, a new strand of the literature considered that others’ outcomes also matter to 
decision makers. By introducing the concept of social preferences, others’ outcomes were 
integrated into decision makers’ utility functions (e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Dawes, 1980; 
Taylor, 1977). In other words, this line of research began investigating the nature and boundary 
conditions of prosocial, competitive, and selfish acts. In social decision settings capturing 
situations in which individuals’ choices affect not only themselves but also others, formal models 
of Utility Theory are used to describe how individuals value certain actions depending on their 
weighting of outcomes for themselves and others affected (Messick & McClintock, 1968). An 
example of such a decision situation is a dictator game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 
1994), in which one person decides about both her own outcomes and those of a second player. For 
simplicity, a decomposed dictator game is introduced here (Figure 2). Decision makers are 
assigned to the role of the dictator or the receiver. The dictator chooses between two options, 
where one alternative maximizes her own monetary payoff (for example, in Option A, the dictator 
receives 10 units and the matched player receives 2 units) and the other option benefits the other 
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player through a reduction of the dictator’s payoff (for example, in Option B, the dictator receives 
7 units and the matched player receives 5 units, Figure 2, Example 1). The trade-off between own 
and others’ payoff can be represented as differences in the respective decision weights wown and 
wother: 
U = wown×(own payoff) + wother×(others’ payoff). 
Individuals who positively value their own payoffs and disregard others’ outcomes (e.g., wown = 1; 
wother = 0) are more likely to choose the option maximizing their own payoff, which has a higher 
utility for them (payoffOption A = 10, payoffOption B = 7) compared to individuals who assign 
positive value to both their own and others’ payoffs (e.g., wown = 0.5; wother = 0.5, payoffOption A 
= 6, payoffOption B = 6.5). Further, consider another variant of this task in which dictators can forgo 
higher outcomes to avoid that the other player gains payoffs (e.g., in Option A, the dictator receives 
10 units and the matched player receives 2 units, whereas in Option C, the dictator receives 9 units 
and the matched player receives 0.5 units; Figure 2, Example 2). Individuals who positively value 
their own payoffs and negatively value others’ outcomes, so-called competitive players, (e.g., wown 
= 0.5; wother = -0.5) would be more likely to choose the option that deducts outcomes from the 
other. 
The form in which others’ outcomes are integrated into the decision makers’ utility 
function has been the object of several theories of social preferences. Depending on the situations 
in which behavior is predicted, these theories added different components to the simple utility 
function suggested above. For instance, the Reciprocity Model (Rabin, 1993) suggested that people 
will forgo own material outcomes to help or punish others depending on their previous behavior. 
The Fehr-Schmidt model (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) added inequity aversion to the utility function, 
proposing that some decision makers dislike options where they receive different outcomes than 
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others because they are better or worse off, and will make choices to minimize this imbalance. The 
Boloton-Ockenfels model (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) enriched utility functions by components of 
equity and reciprocity concerns, as well as competitive behaviour. 
Preferences for allocating resources between oneself and another person are thought to have 
relatively stable, trait-like characteristics (McClintock & van Avermaet, 1982; Swap & Rubin, 1983; 
van Lange, 2000), referred to as Social Value Orientation (SVO, Figure 3, van Lange, 1999; for an 
overview, see Murphy & Ackermann, 2013). The weight assigned to own and others’ outcomes 
allows the categorization of decision makers into types. Most commonly, decision makers present 
with altruistic (wown = 0; wother = 1), prosocial (wown = 0.5; wother = 0.5), individualistic (wown 
= 1; wother = 0) or competitive (wown = 0.5; wother = -0.5) preferences, or intermediate assigned 
weights (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011), although other weightings of own and others’ 
outcomes are possible (e.g., martyrdom: wown = -0.5; wother = 0.5). SVO has been shown to be 
strongly related to the Honesty-Humility factor of personality (Hilbig & Zettler, 2009), the general 
tendency to be fair to others (Ashton & Lee, 2007), and strongly predicts cooperation behaviour in 
a variety of situations (for a review, see Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008): Individualistic and 
competitive types are less likely to share resources than prosocial and altruistic types (for a meta-
analysis, see Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009), and therefore are more likely at the root of conflict. 
5. Conflict in Group Decision Settings 
Not only the decisions individuals make in dyadic relationships harbour the potential for 
conflict; individuals in groups and groups as decision making entities can raise conflict (Choi & 
Bowles, 2007). For instance, in a time of globalized mobility, strong emphasis on freedom of 
movement and of rising flows of migration, societies experience new challenges in deciding how 
to face increasing numbers of immigrants of all types. As the number of newcomers rises, the 
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native population’s willingness to trust and to approach a foreigner might sink (La Macchia, Louis, 
Hornsey, & Leonardelli, 2016). The question of how the native population interacts with 
newcomers therefore becomes a pressing issue in many societies. In some situations, people might 
find themselves less likely to help a foreigner. Although the question of how societies face 
increased immigration is a complex issue, parts of this challenge can be distilled into a question of 
intergroup interactions: how do members of an ingroup interact with those of an outgroup? What 
are the driving forces of cooperation and competition in these circumstances? Understanding 
decisions embedded in a group setting therefore affords opportunities to understand conflict. 
6. Conflict in Group Decision Settings: Empirical Evidence 
Phenomenologically, the influence of group membership on cooperation and competition 
has been observed in a variety of contexts, indicating that ingroup members are often favoured and 
outgroups can even be derogated (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). For instance, outgroup 
members are trusted less (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000) and disfavoured in 
prosocial decision making (for a meta-analysis, see Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). 
A model of how cooperation and competition is affected by group membership was 
proposed by Chen and Li (2009), in which the weight wother assigned to others’ outcomes in 
decision makers’ utility functions is determined by their membership to the ingroup our outgroup I, 
which leads to the (simplified) utility function 
U = wown×(own payoff ) + wotherI×(others′payoff ) . 
In more detail (Chen & Li, 2009, p. 441), the utility function proposes that the weight 
placed on others’ outcomes depending on their group membership is differently affected when 
decision makers’ own outcomes are larger or smaller than the other persons’ outcomes. Supporting 
this theoretical proposition empirically, decision makers were found to be less charitable to 
outgroup vs. ingroup members when their own outcomes were larger than the other players’, and to 
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be more envious of outgroup vs. ingroup members when their own outcomes were smaller than the 
other players’ (Chen & Li, 2009). 
Other investigations of strategic interactions between groups have used different 
conceptualizations of conflict. For instance, the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (Bornstein, 2003; 
Figure 4) has been used to study “ingroup love” and “outgroup hate,” played by two groups of 
three players each. Players receive an endowment of 10 units, which will be doubled if they keep 
them to themselves (i.e., the payoff would be 20 units if all are kept). Alternatively, players can 
invest (parts of) their endowment in a joint pool. For each unit invested in the joint pool, all 
ingroup members receive 1 unit, while 1 unit is deducted from all outgroup members. While some 
players will keep the endowment to themselves, others will invest in the joint pool, effectively 
contributing to intergroup conflict. When given the option to choose between keeping the 
endowment (i.e., investing it to benefit the ingroup and hurt the outgroup) or investing it only to 
benefit the ingroup (Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma - Maximizing Differences, Halevy, Bornstein, 
& Sagiv, 2008; Figure 4), findings suggest that most players prefer benefitting the ingroup only 
over both benefiting the ingroup and actively harming the outgroup. Conflict between groups, 
therefore, is not necessarily inevitable. Moreover, whether individuals engage in intergroup 
conflict also depends on individual differences: while some individuals are universalists and 
benefit others across the boundaries of groups, others are more parochial, keen to benefit only their 
ingroup (Aaldering & Böhm, 2019). It is the latter type of individuals, then, who drive conflict 
behaviour. 
7. Conflict in Group Decision Settings: Theoretical Perspectives 
Beyond this phenomenological description of how group membership influences 
cooperation and competition, a number of prominent theories are concerned with explaining human 
conflict in group settings more broadly (for an overview, see Hogg, 2016). Early theories of 
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behaviour in group settings posited that extreme behaviour of benefitting the ingroup and 
discriminating against the outgroup, resulting in intergroup conflict, would be instigated by an 
authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Stanford, 1950), and by 
frustration turning into aggression (Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). Taking a 
context-based approach, the Realistic Group Conflict Theory suggested that intergroup conflict 
emerged because rivalling groups faced conflicts of interest about their group goals (Sherif, 1966; 
Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). In economics, labour marked discrimination has 
been explained using models of taste-based discrimination (i.e., driven by the desire (taste) to avoid 
hiring minority workers, Becker, 1957) and statistical discrimination (i.e., driven by substitution of 
individual ability expectations by group average ability, Phelps, 1972). 
Contemporary research draws predominantly on three theories to understand intergroup 
behaviour. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) summarizes cognitive, 
motivational and behavioural influences of group settings. Aiming to explain why people form and 
maintain groups, Social Identity Theory posits that individuals derive part of their self-concept 
from their categorization into social groups. Therein, they act not as individuals but as (self-
categorized) members of their groups who aim to achieve positive distinctiveness from other 
groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). To maintain the ingroup identity and distinctiveness from other 
groups, discriminatory behaviour - and conflict - emerges. It was argued that behaviour favouring 
the ingroup and discriminating against the outgroup does not require competition of groups over 
resources (in contrast to the Realistic Group Conflict Theory), but that mere categorization into 
groups is a sufficient condition. When decision makers were assigned to minimal groups (i.e., 
groups with whom the participant shared no common past or future, group members were 
anonymous, and there was no conflict of interest over group outcomes), their choices demonstrated 
ingroup favouritism (e.g., Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). 
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Translating the concepts of social categorization and identity into economic analyses, 
ingroup favouritism is also captured by Identity Theory (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Bénabou & 
Tirole, 2011). The theory holds that social categorization and the resulting identity, such as being 
an alumnus of a certain college, is associated with specific expectations of behaviour, e.g., for 
donations to be directed to one’s alma mater, not a different college (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). 
Complying with these expectations maximizes utility, whereas deviating from the expectations 
causes disutility. Therefore, rational decision makers would behave in line with expectations 
stemming from the social categories to which they belong. The utility function (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000) holds that utility for the individual j depends on the possible actions a of j and all 
others (–j), as well as on j’s identity Ij): 
Uj = Uj (aj, a-j, Ij), 
where the identity is represented by 
Ij = Ij (aj, a-j, cj, εj, P). 
The identity depends on j’s assigned social categories cj, and on several factors in relation to what 
is expected of someone belonging to these categories (in which the expectations are captured in P): 
the vector εj captures the degree to which j corresponds to the personal characteristics expected, 
and the degree to which own (aj) and others’ actions (a-j) correspond to the expected actions. 
Although these theories assigned great importance to social identity in determining 
behaviour in broader contexts, the Bounded Generalized Reciprocity Theory (Yamagishi, Jin, & 
Kiyonari, 1999) focused on the strategic advantage of group membership for maximizing one’s 
own outcomes. The theory proposed that groups help decision makers form better expectations of 
others’ likelihood to cooperate. Ingroup members can be expected to cooperate more than outgroup 
members, in turn increasing the likelihood that other ingroup members will cooperate with them. 
These expectations are based on a system of indirect reciprocity and reputation. The theory 
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proposes that ingroup members have a reputation to cooperate that leads other ingroup members to 
expect them to cooperate. Additionally, reputation promotes cooperation even when there is no 
direct history of cooperativeness between the same people. Decision makers obtain and maintain 
the ingroup member status that allows them to benefit from favourable treatment by the ingroup. 
Consequently, outgroups are trusted less, from which outgroup derogation can follow (for a meta-
analysis, see Balliet & van Lange, 2013). 
8. Conflict in Group Decision Settings: Cognitive Processes  
A socio-cognitive strand of the literature has added the first empirical investigations of the 
cognitive bases specific to cooperation and defection in group contexts (for a review, see Amodio, 
2014). Initial evidence suggests that mental configurations for processing information related to 
ingroup and outgroup members differ. For example, this evidence shows that outgroup members 
are evaluated more negatively (Brewer, 1979; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Mullen, Brown, & 
Smith, 1992; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990), that people make more positive 
spontaneous trait inferences about ingroup than outgroup members (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000), 
and that positive stereotypes are more rapidly associated with ingroup members (Dovidio, Evans, 
& Tyler, 1986). Furthermore, ingroup members are judged to be more similar to oneself than 
outgroup members even in artificial, minimal groups (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996), which is thought 
to be based on inferences from own traits to the ingroup (Otten & Epstude, 2006). In short, 
research finds that people’s cognitive landscape is set up in a way that facilitates ingroup-favouring 
behaviour. 
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9. Conflict of Individuals within their Groups 
In addition to conflicts between individuals or between groups, conflicts may arise between 
individuals in a group. One way of conceptualizing these conflicts between members of the same 
group is by considering the object or source of the conflict (Jehn, 1995): relationship conflict stems 
from interpersonal incompatibilities among group members that may give rise to tension, 
animosity, and annoyance within one’s group whereas task conflict concerns disagreements about 
the content of and the best way to approach a task the group is working on together. Although it 
seems intuitive that within a group, any type of conflict would necessarily be bad (in terms of 
productivity, wellbeing, and other outcomes), empirical evidence suggests that conflict is not 
necessarily bad and may sometimes even be good. In a seminal study, Karen Jehn (1995) examined 
over 100 workgroups and management teams in a large trucking company and showed that 
whether or not conflict was beneficial depended on the type of conflict and the type of task on 
which the group worked. Specifically, although both task and relationship conflict lowered 
satisfaction and interpersonal liking, and increased people’s intentions to leave the group, task and 
relationship conflict had different effects on group performance. For routine tasks, disagreements 
about the tasks were detrimental to the groups’ functioning; however, for non-routine, complex 
tasks, disagreement about the task were not detrimental to the groups’ functioning, and could even 
increase group performance: Task conflict encourages creativity and diversity of opinions which – 
provided it does not result in relationship conflict – increases the quality of the decisions made 
(Bradley, Postlethwaite, Klotz, Hamdani, & Brown, 2012; De Dreu, 2006; Farh, Lee, & Farh, 
2010), e.g., by avoiding groupthink (Janis, 1982) and common knowledge effects (Gigone & 
Hastie, 1993). 
This finding that relationship conflict is detrimental whereas task conflict may have 
positive or negative effects depending on the complexity of the task the group faces kindled further 
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research, summarized in two meta-analyses drawing markedly different conclusions. One meta-
analysis summarizing 30 studies on intragroup conflict concluded that mild compared to no 
conflict could improve group performance, and that severe conflict decreased group performance 
(De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). However, there was no evidence that relationship and task conflict 
led to different outcomes (DeDreu & Weingart, 2003). In contrast, a meta-analysis summarizing 
116 studies (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012) found support for Jehn’s (1995) original claim: 
relationship conflict was associated with worse group outcomes. Further, evidence suggested that 
task conflict could increase performance, specifically when top management teams faced task 
conflict, when group performance was assessed in terms of financial performance or decision 
quality, and when task conflict was accompanied by only little relationship conflict. 
Another perspective on sources of intragroup conflict considers individual-level differences 
between group members, such as gender, education, or personality. Within-group diversity may 
create faultlines, i.e., dividing lines arising from interindividual differences that may split group 
members into subgroups (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). As their physical counterparts, group faultlines 
may lay dormant and only crack open when triggered. Moderate within-group faultlines have been 
shown to give rise to less intragroup conflict than strong or weak faultlines (Thatcher, Jehn, & 
Zanutto, 2003). In essence, the formation of within-group subgroups brings with it the 
opportunities and challenges that are associated with higher order groups as well. 
10. Coalitions 
Finally, conflict may occur in situations harbouring the potential for coalition formation. 
When more than two individuals or groups (hereafter summarized by the term parties) are present 
and have opposing interests, some may join forces to substantiate their claims and improve their 
chances of achieving their goals. Coalition formation becomes key when a single party cannot 
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achieve its goal without the support of a coalition member. In this case, parties need others to 
achieve their goals, but must also realize that a coalition could be formed without them. 
Coalition formation is often investigated by means of simple weighted majority games. In 
such games, the parties are informed that they have to pool their resources to be able to decide how 
to allocate payoffs. Take, for example, the 5(4 3 2) game, in which three parties negotiate about the 
allocation of a total payoff of 100 units. Party A represents the interests of four people, party B 
represents three people, and party C represents two people (Figure 5), and decisions are only 
possible if a majority of all people agree. People may not leave their parties. The total number of 
people in this situation is nine, and therefore any combination of at least five people would be able 
to allocate the payoffs in the way they want. Put differently, party A and B could form an AB-
coalition, or party A and C could form an AC-coalition, or party B and C could form an BC-
coalition. An ABC-coalition could also emerge. What coalition is most likely to emerge? And how 
would the payoff be allocated, depending on the type of coalition formed? 
Several theories address this setup (for an overview, see Kahan & Rapoport, 2014; 
Murnighan, 1978; van Beest & van Dijk, 2007). Here, we consider two perspectives: minimum 
power theory and minimum resource theory (Gamson, 1961, 1964). Both theories share the 
assumption that all parties involved want to maximize their own payoffs and not that of others. The 
second shared assumption is that parties will base the allocations of outcomes to coalition members 
on distributive fairness norms: If all members of the coalition have contributed equally to the 
coalition it is assumed that they will ask for an equal share and will be given that share. If some 
coalition members have contributed more than others, it is assumed that they will ask a share that is 
proportional to their input. However, these two coalition theories differ in what they consider to be 
the most appropriate bargaining chip available to the parties. 
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Minimum power theory (Gamson, 1964) assumes that both the type of coalition and 
allocation of payoffs will be based on the relative power of every potential coalition party. Power is 
based on the Shapley-Shubik index of pivotal power (Shapley & Shubik, 1954): the relative 
frequency with which the resources of one party, when added to the resources of another party, 
convert a non-winning coalition into a winning coalition. In the example above, all possible 
combinations of parties are coalitions that control a majority of the votes and thus all possible 
combinations are winning coalitions. Hence, all players are equally powerful, as all players can 
turn a winning coalition into a losing one equally often. Minimum power theory predicts that 
parties expect and obtain an equal share of the payoffs in every coalition. In the example above, 
every party in the ABC-coalition would expect to obtain 1/3 of the total payoff each. In the AB-, 
AC-, BC-coalition, parties would expect 1/2 of the total payoff, i.e., 50 units each. Assuming that 
all parties strive to maximize their own outcomes, the prediction is that the grand coalition (ABC-
coalition) will not be formed. Instead, it is assumed that every two-party coalition is equally likely 
to be formed, and that payoffs will be allocated only to those that are in the coalition (50 each) and 
not to the party excluded from the coalition. 
Minimum resource theory (Gamson, 1961) assumes that both the type of coalition and 
allocation of payoffs will be based on the relative contribution in terms of resources. In the 
example above, this theory predicts that parties will demand a share of the payoffs in each of these 
coalitions that is proportional to the number of people that they represent. In the AB-coalition, 7 
people are represented, and A would demand 4/7 and B would demand 3/7 of the total payoff. In 
the AC-coalition, A would demand 4/6 and C would demand 2/6 of the 100 units. In the BC-
coalition, B would demand 3/5 and C would demand 2/5 of the 100 units. In the ABC-coalition, A 
would demand 4/9, B 3/9, and C 2/9 of the 100 units. As in minimum power theory, the crucial 
assumption remains that all parties want to maximize their own outcomes. As in minimum power 
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theory, a grand coalition (ABC-coalition) is therefore not predicted to be formed. However, 
different from minimum power theory, minimum resource theory makes specific predictions about 
what coalition will be formed and how payoffs will be allocated. In the example above, because the 
BC-coalition maximizes the individual payoff to the party members relative to all other potential 
coalitions, it is predicted to be formed. Minimum resource theory therefore also outlines that those 
who bring the most resources to the bargaining table are not necessarily those who walk away with 
the lion’s share of the payoffs. After all, in the example above, party A represented more 
individuals than any other party. However, because of the entitlement that comes with this relative 
strength in resources, this party is likely to be excluded from the winning coalitions. By the same 
token, this suggests an unexpected amount of influence that lies with ostensibly small parties: 
Because they have relatively little claim to the payoffs, they become attractive coalition partners. 
From the perspective of both theories, conflict is sometimes resolved not by a solution that 
is beneficial to all parties involved, but instead to a subset or coalition. Further, some instances of 
conflict are resolved not to the benefit of those that appear to have the best cards (i.e., bring the 
most resources to the table) but instead to the benefit of those that appear to be weak and are 
equipped with few resources. 
Mimicking the insights on dyadic conflict, coalition research has also departed from the 
general assumption that all players are equally motivated to maximize their own payoffs (van Beest 
& van Dijk, 2007). For example, current insights highlight that social preferences of coalition 
parties may also influence the preference for forming coalitions that maximize the outcome of its 
members relative to forming coalitions that maximize the outcome of the group. Specifically, 
parties with a prosocial orientation are more likely form unnecessary large coalitions - i.e, 
coalitions that obtain more members than would be formally required to win – than parties with a 
proself orientation (van Beest & van Dijk, 2007). This finding appears to be stronger in intergroup 
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coalitions in which groups of a specific orientation need to form coalitions with other groups than 
in interpersonal coalition formation in which individuals of a specific orientation form coalition 
with other individuals (van Beest, Andeweg, Koning, & van Lange, 2008). Relatedly, coalition 
formation is not necessarily about decisions that only benefit the coalition members, but coalition 
members also allocate payoffs to those that are not part of the coalition (van Beest, van Dijk, & 
Wilke, 2003). 
Take for example a situation in which three parties negotiate about a gain or a loss of 60 
units and that any majority of two parties would be able to enforce how these payoffs are allocated 
to the individual parties. A traditional perspective of coalition formation would assume that the 
outcome would not depend on the gain vs. loss domain. In the gain situation, this would imply that 
two parties would form a small coalition, allocating all the payoffs to the coalition members and 
zero payoffs to the excluded party. In the loss situation, this would imply that two parties form a 
small coalition, allocate zero losses to themselves and consequently allocate all losses to the 
excluded party. This, however, is not what is observed empirically in coalition formation. 
Following the principle of do-no-harm (Baron, 1993, 1995), experiments have shown that coalition 
bargainers perceive the withholding of gains to excluded parties as less harmful than the assigning 
of losses to excluded parties. Consequently, although parties were indeed likely to form small two-
party coalitions in the gain domain, they were more likely to form grand three-player coalitions in 
the loss domain (van Beest, van Dijk, de Dreu, & Wilke, 2005). In the gain domain, both parties 
split the gains equally between themselves (in this example, both earn 30 units, leaving the 
excluded party with 0 units). In the loss domain, all three members of the coalition split the losses 
equally between themselves (i.e, each party loses 20 units). When there is a conflict about gains, 
parties may indeed maximize their individual gains. However, if the conflict is framed in terms of 
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losses, parties may not be inclined to minimize their own loss, but instead be more concerned with 
minimizing the losses of others. 
In sum, conflicts can also occur in complex situations in which power is distributed 
asymmetrically between a number of parties. Studying which parties will coalesce, and whether 
they will exclude others or integrate them in a coalition even when that means reducing their own 
potential gains, is an important steppingstone to understanding intricate social situations with 
multiple players. 
11. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have outlined perspectives on understanding how and when conflict 
emerges, how it plays out, and how it can be ameliorated or put to one’s advantage. From small-
scale conflict between individuals to large-scale conflicts between groups, or even in cases in 
which individuals stand in opposition to their groups, conflict captures competing goals and 
unaligned interests of the involved parties. Conflicts delineate social settings in which opinions, 
interests, and preferences collide. As such, conflict can be detrimental when the interests of one 
party are ignored or overruled by those of another. Yet, conflict and competition can also be 
productive, spurring forward the actors involved to outperform others. Conflict can also give rise to 
cooperative resolutions -- as in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma even against predictions of 
standard theory, or when conflict gives rise to creativity and diversity of opinion. Therefore, 
conflict is above all a situation that harbours much potential, and can consequently be pivotal for 
social change. 
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Option B  0  1 
(defect) 4  1  
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
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Example 1 Example 2 
 
 
 Option A Option B Option A Option B 
Dictator receives 10 7 10 9 
Matched player receives 2 5 2 0.5 
 
Figure 2. Examples of decomposed dictator games. 
  




Figure 3. Graphical representation of the dimensions of Social Value Orientation. 
  





















   2 3 1 2 3 
IPD Keep + 10 0 0 0 0 0 
 Between 
group pool + x + x + x - x - x - x 
IPD-M D Keep + 10 0 0 0 0 0 
 Between 
group pool + x + x + x - x - x - x 
 Within 
group pool + x + x + x 0 0 0 
 
Figure 4. Schematic representation of the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) and the 
Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Differences (IPD-MD) games. 
  








Figure 5. Schematic representation of a coalition game. 
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